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1. Introduction: different committee systems in different forms of 
government 
 
As Michel Debré used to say with regard to the French Fourth 
Republic, too many and too powerful committees in parliament can limit 
substantially the margin of manoeuvre of the executive branch in ruling 
over the country.1 The standing committees were so strong as to 
become incompatible with the parliamentary form of government in 
existence at that time (1946 to 1958). 
The setting up of standing committees for carrying out legislative 
oversight or scrutiny activities characterizes all parliaments in Europe 
and, potentially, in the world.2 By “standing committees” we refer to 
those parliamentary bodies set up systematically at the beginning of 
every parliamentary term for the duration of the entire legislature – 
although their composition can be adjusted and updated to the political 
reality – and having a specialized jurisdiction, provided in binding rules 
or practice,3 on a set of subject-matters as to cover the whole spectrum of 
public policies. In this sense they are deemed to form a “committee 
system”, based on a mutual relationship among these committees as for 
their composition and participation in parliamentary procedures. 
Although the operation of standing committees does not prevent the 
creation of ad hoc or special committees, legislatures usually rely on the 
former for the greater part of their constitutional tasks. 
                                                                                            
1 See Debré, Michel, “Trois caractéristiques du système parlementaire français”. 
In, Revue française de science politique, volume 5, n°1, p. 46, 1955. 
2 According to a report published by the Interparliamentary Union, every 
democratic country has a legislature organized in committees: see Interparliamentary 
Union, Tools for parliamentary oversight. A comparative study of 88 national 
parliaments. Edited by H. Yamamoto, Genève, p15, 2008. 
3 Usually the boundaries of the jurisdictions of standing committees are fixed 
in the parliamentary rules of procedures or standing orders. Sometimes they can be 
set in the Constitution itself or by means of constitutional conventions, or 
parliamentary practice. 
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Moreover, standing committees enjoy a privileged relationship 
with the executive branch. They look closely at the daily activity of the 
Ministers and departmental secretaries, by subject-matter. Standing 
committees and Ministries entertain a constant “dialogue” on the 
relevant bills examined in parliament with regard to amendments tabled 
and the committee stage in the legislative process. 
Given such a close relationship between standing committees and 
“their” Ministers, since the committees’ jurisdiction corresponds 
basically to the Ministries’ portfolios, it has been expressly 
acknowledged that parliaments, by means of their committees, are 
deemed capable to define the general political directions and priorities 
of national policies;4 in other words, standing committees are able to 
shape the form of government in a certain legal system, that is the 
relationship between constitutional bodies entitled to set the general 
political directions in a polity.5 At least potentially, the relationship 
between legislatures and executives is so intense within committees that 
the rules presiding over their functioning can strongly condition the 
performance of a certain form of government, especially where 
committees are empowered with veto or (autonomous) decision-making 
powers. When this happens the Executive is forced to negotiate the 
measures to be adopted with these parliamentary bodies. 
Parliaments have changed substantially over time, particularly in 
the new century, as a consequence of new phenomena appearing in the 
                                                                                            
4 Volpi, Mauro, Libertà e autorità. La classificazione delle forme di Stato e delle 
forme di governo. Torino: Giappichelli, p109, 2010. “General political directions and 
priorities” is an expression used in the English version of Art. 15 TEU with reference 
to the European Council. This is an approximation to the Italian notion of “indirizzo 
politico” or the German notion of “Richtlinien der Politik” that do not exist properly 
either in French or in English. The official English translation of the German Basic 
Law uses “the general guidelines of policy” in the place of “Richtlinien der Politik” (Art. 
65 GG). The official translation of the Italian Constitution for “indirizzo politico (e 
amministrativo)” (Art. 95 Const.), instead, as “general policy” seems not completely 
satisfactory. On the problem of translation in comparative law, see Sacco, Rodolfo, 
“Lingua e diritto”. In, Traduzione e diritto – Ars Interpretandi. Annuario di 
ermeneutica giuridica. Padova: Cedam, p117 et seqq., 2000. 
5 These constitutional bodies are certainly the Parliament and the Government, 
on the basis of the presence or the lack of a confidence relationship, and also, according 
to what the Constitution provides, the electoral body and political parties, whereas the 
judiciary and Constitutional Courts are in principle excluded from the notion of “form 
of government”. See Luciani, Massimo, “Governo (forme di)”. In, Enciclopedia del 
diritto, IIIrd revision, Annali. Milano: Giuffrè, p538-540, 2009. Under these 
conditions, there can be parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential forms of 
government. 
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institutional landscape, such as the transfer of significant normative 
powers from legislatures to executives, the crisis of the parliamentary 
legislation and of the long standing representative function of political 
parties and legislatures, globalization and the deepening of processes of 
regional integration, mediatisation and personalization of politics, as 
well as the rise of populist movements. By the same token, for example 
we have witnessed a shift in the balance between the exercise of the 
legislative and the oversight function in legislatures in favour of the 
latter.  
This paper argues that, in spite of the transformations of 
parliaments, standing committees, also by way of constitutional, 
legislative or standing orders’ reforms, have accommodated their role 
accordingly, and are still influential in shaping the form of government. 
This relationship, between standing committees and operation of 
a form of government is presented in three legal systems, France, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom (UK). These case studies have been selected 
on the basis of the different nature of their forms of government, semi-
presidential in France and parliamentary in the other two countries, 
although loosely “rationalised” in Italy while (traditionally) very stable 
and centered on the role of the Prime Minister in the UK.6 The 
committee systems in the three parliaments also show rather diverse 
features in terms of structure and powers assigned to standing 
committees7. While the standing committees of the Italian Parliament 
have been usually considered very powerful in the legislative process, 
those of the French National Assembly and of the UK House of 
Commons are often described as weak when it comes to the exercise of 
lawmaking power, although for different reasons (the size for the 
French committees and the lack of permanent committees dealing with 
                                                                                            
6 The notion of “rationalised parliamentarism” was coined by Mirkine-
Guetzévitch, Boris, Les Constitutions de l’Europe nouvelle. Paris: Delagrave, 1928, 
aiming to define the parliamentary forms of government whose stability and 
endurance (and thus the prevention of political crisis) is ensured by legal mechanisms 
preferably entrenched by the Constitution. Until recently and, in particular, until the 
Fixed Term Parliament Act 2011, the British parliamentary system has shown a low 
level of “rationalization” as for the presence of written legal rules providing a detailed 
discipline of the form of government, but, in spite of this, has always performed as a 
very stable system. 
7 However, the analysis here is limited to the role of standing committees in the 
lower Chambers, given the peculiar features that identify the British House of Lords 
and the French Senate with reference to their composition and powers and, in addition, 
the circumstance that both are excluded from the confidence relationship with the 
executive.  
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bills in the UK). By contrast, in relation to scrutiny and oversight 
powers, the select committees of the UK House of Commons are deemed 
to be very influential, the Italian standing committees play a marginal 
role, whereas the committees of the French National Assembly stand 
halfway. However, in the last few years the transformation of the 
executive-legislative relationship, achieved by means of a constitutional 
reform in France and of legislative and standing orders’ reforms as well 
as of changes of the institutional practice in Italy and the UK, has 
confirmed the centrality of standing committees for the proper 
functioning of those forms of government. Hence for the case selection, 
“the most different case logic”8 has been used, in order to show that, 
despite the patent differences amongst the three committee systems, all 
of them are crucial for guaranteeing the equilibrium of the forms of 
government. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview 
of the constituent moment of standing committees in the three 
legislatures as a turning point for the transformation of parliaments; 
Section 3 examines the structure and the organisation of the system of 
standing committees in each country; Section 4 analyses the evolution 
of the three forms of government in the light of the changes of the 
powers of the standing committees; finally, Section 5, attempts to draw 
some conclusions on the basis of the comparison between the three 
constitutional case-studies. 
 
 
2. Transforming parliaments. The setting up of standing committees in 
France, Italy and the UK 
 
The legislature’s choice to create a system of standing committees 
in the twentieth century depended on many factors: for instance, the 
engagement of the State, and consequently of the executive, in 
exercising new public functions and in providing social services; the 
need to control public expenditure more carefully; the growth of the 
statutes approved; the rise of a more complex and technical legislation. 
These factors imposed on parliaments more rational arrangements in 
order to face their new workload. Standing committees fitted perfectly 
with parliaments in search of a more specialised support to their activity, 
                                                                                            
8 See Hirschl, Ian, “The Question of Case Selection in Comparative 
Constitutional Law”. In, The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 53, n°1, p125-
155, 2005. 
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dealing with highly complex and technical bills, and for faster decision-
making procedures. 
Another prominent factor forced (most) parliaments to organise 
in committees, namely the creation of parliamentary groups as stable 
structures and points of reference for parliamentary procedures. The 
weight of groups in committees was proportional to their size in the 
Chamber. Thus, by sitting in committees political groups were able to 
control the crucial activities of pre-legislative scrutiny and oversight 
much better than had occurred in the previous Bureaux, whose 
components were chosen at random, or than the Committee of the 
Whole House, where parliamentarians (MPs) participated on a 
voluntary basis. The process of institutionalisation of standing 
committees, which entails a transformation of the parliament itself, 
however, has taken place at different moments in the history of the 
selected legislatures.  
Since the period of the Revolution of 1789, the French legal 
system has always experienced an ambivalent relationship vis-à-vis 
parliamentary committees, in particular the standing committees. 
Periodically there has been a swing between their refusal, acceptance or 
even enhancement,9 as a consequence of constitutional developments. 
Every French Constitution elaborated its own model of committees or 
forbade them. For example, while the Constituent Assembly of 1789 set 
up around thirty standing committees, specialised by subject-matter, 
the Convention of 1792 conferred on standing committees the power to 
rule as if they were governmental authorities enabled to take decisions; 
and then, from 1795 until 1848 no standing committees were in 
operation within the French legislatures.10 Subsequently, from 1848 to 
the formation of the French Third Republic, in 1871, parliamentary 
activities were organised according to the system of the Bureaux –
temporarily established and composed of MPs chosen by way of 
drawing – lacking any other organisational principle that could shape 
the legislature.11 Only in 1902, by way of an amendment to the existing 
rules of procedure, did the establishment of standing committees 
                                                                                            
9 See Türk, Pauline, Les commissions perlementaires permanentes et le 
renouvau du Parlement sous la Ve République. Paris: Dalloz, p35-44, 2005. 
10 See Roques, Xavier & Herin, Jean-Louis, “Les commissions parlementaires”. 
In, Administration, n°120-121, p32 et seqq., 1983. 
11 See Poudra, Jules & Pierre, Eugène, Traité pratique de droit parlementaire, 
Versailles: CERF et fils éditeurs, p970 et seqq., 1878.  
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become a general principle of parliamentary organisation.12 And a few 
years later, on 1st July 1910, following the official set up of political 
groups in the Assembly, the rules of procedure were amended again, so 
as to ensure that the composition of the standing committees reflected 
proportionally the size of political groups in the House. With this 
decision to link standing committees and political groups, which was 
reproduced later on in many other legislatures in the world, the destiny 
of these two kinds of parliamentary bodies became irremediably 
interwoven. Since then, during the French Third and Fourth Republic, 
standing committees have grown in their prestige and number, building 
up a committee system able to control all public policies. The strength 
of standing committees in the presence of highly fragmented ruling 
coalitions in the executive branch put into question even the endurance 
of the government in office. Standing committees became so powerful 
that later the founding fathers of the Fifth Republic, in 1958, 
deliberately decided to marginalise these parliamentary bodies in the 
new constitutional architecture, up to the point that they were 
considered the main “victims” of the attempt to rationalise the French 
form of government.13 
By contrast, the British parliamentary tradition, until recently, 
has not favoured a process of institutionalization of a committee system. 
For a long time, at least until the end of the Seventies, the will of the 
British executives to control parliamentary activities undermined the 
effectiveness of parliamentary committees, which were kept deliberately 
powerless by prohibiting their establishment as standing committees. 
According to the distinction proposed by Norton, between 
“chamber-oriented” and “committee-oriented” legislatures, the British 
Parliament fell undoubtedly into the first category14. Before the 1979 
reform of the Standing Orders, the House was at the heart of 
parliamentary work and the executive found it relatively easy to 
supervise its activity instead of being involved in complex negotiations 
with several committees. 
                                                                                            
12 See the resolution proposed by Antide Boyer, on 1st June 1902, « Journal 
officiel, Documents parlementaires », Chambres, session ordinaire, p2282, 1902. 
13 See Debré, Michel, “Trois caractéristiques du système parlementaire”, cit., 
p47 and Türk, Pauline, Les commissions parlementaires permanentes et le renouveau 
du Parlement sous la Ve République, cit., p29. 
14 See Norton, Philip, “Nascent Institutionalisation: Committees in the British 
Parliament”. In, Longley, Lawrence D., & Davidson, Roger H., The New Roles of 
Parliamentary Committees. London: Frank Cass, p. 143 et seqq., 1998. 
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This did not imply, however, that the British House of Commons 
remained devoid of a clear internal structure. During the Tudor 
Kingdom (1485-1603), when the principle of separation of powers was 
still far from being enforced, the King was used to appointing 
committees in Parliament, aiming to control the activity of this 
institution.15 Nonetheless, the attempt to circumvent such interference 
by the King with parliamentary autonomy led some MPs to meet in 
committees of the whole House, i.e. committees that met in camera to debate 
freely and were composed on a voluntary basis, which later became one 
single committee of the whole House, presided over by a temporary 
chairman, different from the Speaker of the House, who was deemed to 
be a “civil servant” of the King16. The activity of the committee of the 
whole House was kept confidential and showed a low level of 
formalisation compared to the procedure of the House. Since then, and 
until 1979, the proceedings in the House of Commons have been 
arranged according to three formats: the House, the Committee of the 
Whole House, in particular for money bill,17 and special committees, 
appointed on an ad hoc basis to examine only a certain issue and 
dissolved immediately after. It is easy for the executive to gain control 
over special committees, since Ministers and departmental secretaries 
take part in committee meetings as members, as long as they have been 
elected as MPs. A few standing committees, called select committees, 
like the Public Accounts Committee (1861), had been established since 
the end of the nineteenth century, but they enjoyed limited autonomy 
from the executive and they did not oversee a large portion of public 
policies.18 
                                                                                            
15 See Keir, David L., The Constitutional History of Modern Britain. 1485-
1937, II ed.. London: Adam and Charles Black, p151, 1943, and Vila Ramos, Beatriz, 
Los sistemas de comisiones parlamentarias. Madrid: CEPS, p54-55, 1999. 
16 The Committee of the Whole House was firstly summoned in 1606, during 
the reign of James I. See Campion, Gilbert F., An Introduction to the procedure of the 
House of Commons. London: Macmillan, p27, 1947. 
17 The involvement of the Committee of the Whole House does not imply that 
the House is bypassed. Rather, such a committee is summoned before a bill is examined 
in the House and shows a composition that can change item by item, depending on the 
interest of MPs on the issue at stake.  
18 See Todd, Alpheus, On Parliamentary Government in England. Its origin, 
development and practical operation, vol. I. London: Longmans, Green & co., p26 et 
seqq., 1867. The executive controlled committee appointments and often refused to 
transmit to these committees documents and dossiers to be used for their activity. The 
select committee on agriculture, which did not show enough deference towards the 
executive and that insisted on the transmission of some documents, was substantially 
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The increasing awareness about the poor performance of these 
isolated select committees led to the launch of a process of reform of the 
House of Commons’ internal organisation, under the leader of the 
House, Richard Crossman,19 who promoted the experimental setting up 
of a committee system, based on select committees – i.e. standing 
committees – covering the jurisdictions of all executive departments. 
Select committees started to be perceived by backbenchers as tools for 
enhancing their role in parliament and thus their powers were extended 
– they could set up subcommittees, appoint advisers, organize missions 
– and their role was eventually made official by the 1979 reform of the 
House of Commons’ standing orders.20 Since then the organization of 
the House of Commons has remained somewhat unchanged, except for 
the setting up of new select committees – like the select committee on 
justice established in 2002 – or the enlargement of some of their powers, 
for example, allowing the hearings of the Prime Minister from 2001 
onwards. 
In brief, there are around thirty select committees mirroring the 
jurisdiction of the executive’s departments and a Liaison Committee 
that coordinates their activities, being composed of the chairmen of 
select committees. However, select committees are not involved in the 
legislative process (except for pre-legislative scrutiny), their role being 
limited to the scrutiny and oversight function. The lack of “legislative 
authority” of these committees has been subject to debate for decades, 
but an overall reform of the House of Commons’ committee system has 
not yet been proposed.21 
                                                                                            
inhibited from carrying out its activity: see Turpin, Colin & Tomkins, Adam, British 
Government and the Constitution, 7th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p613, 2011. 
19 Being the leader of the House of Commons, Richard Crossman was also a 
member of the Cabinet. 
20 On this reform, see Baines, Priscilla, “History and Rationale of the 1979 
Reforms”. In,  Dewry, Gavin, The New Select Committees. A Study of the 1979 
Reforms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p1 et seqq., 1985, and Giddings, Philip, 
“Select Committees and Parliamentary Scrutiny: Plus Ça Change”. In, Parliamentary 
Affairs, volume 47, n°4, p669-686, 1994. 
21 The fact that select committees are de facto excluded from participating in the 
committee stage of the legislative process does not necessarily imply that they are 
“weak committees”: see Benthon, Meghan & Russell, Meg, “Assessing the Impact of 
Parliamentary Oversight Committees: The Select Committees in the British House of 
Commons”. In, Parliamentary Affairs, p23, May 2012. Contra Mattson, Ingvar & 
Strøm, Kaare, “Parliamentary Committees”. In, Döring, Herbert, Parliaments and 
Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St Martin’s Press, p249-306, 1995. 
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Finally, the setting up of standing committees in the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies has been deeply influenced by the experience of 
the French and the British Parliament. Based on the French example of 
the Bureaux, the internal organization of the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies was basically modeled on such bodies from 1848 to 1920. 
However, such a model was mixed with other institutional 
arrangements, given the wide margin of manoeuvre left by the Albertine 
Statute.22 In 1868 the Committee of the Whole House was established 
and periodically set up in the following years.23 Special committees were 
occasionally established for the examination of bills, particularly at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and even standing committees were 
created in 1863, although they did not participate in the legislative 
process.  
As in the case of the French legislature, in the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies the turning point was represented by the creation of political 
groups in the House, which became the linchpin for the composition of 
parliamentary bodies. Indeed, after the 1919 electoral reform, which 
extended the suffrage and opted for the proportional formula for the 
election of the Chamber (the Senate was appointed by the King), 
political parties, and in particular mass parties, could not be disregarded 
in parliamentary organisation, as happened in the tradition of a 
“parliament of notables”. Following the recognition of political groups 
in the 1920 rules of procedure of the Chamber, nine standing 
committees, specializing in different subject-matter related to the 
government departments and composed proportionally to the size of 
political groups, were finally set up.  
However, the operation of the new committee system was 
challenged by the authoritarian turn of the Italian form of government 
in 1922.24 In a chamber where only the fascist party was admitted, the 
                                                                                            
22 Article 55 of the Albertine Statute of 1848 allows each Chamber to set up 
internal bodies for carrying out their activities without imposing clear constraints on 
the nature and composition of these bodies. See M. Mancini, U. Galeotti, Norme ed usi 
del Parlamento italiano, Roma, 1887, p. 212 and, more recently, Gianfrancesco, 
Eduardo, “Uffici e Commissioni nel diritto parlamentare del periodo statutario”. In, 
Amministrazioneincammino.it, p 5-7, July 2013. 
23 One of the most enthusiastic supporters of the Committee of the Whole 
House was Francesco Crispi (also a Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Italy), who was 
very much in favour of the “transplant” of the British model to Italy. 
24 See Orsina, Giovanni, “L’organizzazione politica nelle Camere della 
proporzionale: 1920-1924”. In, Grassi Orsini, Fabio, & Quagliariello, Gaetano, Il 
partito politico dalla grande guerra al fascismo: crisi della rappresentanza e riforma 
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provision on the proportional representation of groups within the 
standing committees could not be applied, and thus these bodies were 
replaced by the system of Bureaux until 1939, when the entire Chamber 
of Deputies was abolished and substituted by the Chamber of Fasces and 
Corporations, representing the different branches of trade and 
industry.25 
Despite the different origins of the committee systems in Italy, 
France and the UK, the constitutional developments and the evolution 
of the form of government to some extent forced the three legislatures 
to set up standing committees able to control the executive, to adapt 
their functioning and even to limit their powers, as the case of France 
during the Fifth Republic shows.  
 
 
3. The position of standing committees in Parliament and the 
organisation of the committee system26 
 
3.1. The French National Assembly 
 
A. Constitutional acknowledgment 
The French Constitution of 1958 has chosen to define as many 
elements as possible about the structure and the functions of standing 
committees. On the one hand, such a detailed discipline derives from the 
will of the founding fathers to put committee activity “under 
constitutional control”. On the other hand, by means of constitutional 
provisions, especially those introduced by Constitutional Law no. 2008-
724 of 23rd July 2008, standing committees are decisively empowered 
and, being entrenched in the Constitution, committees’ powers have a 
                                                                                            
dello stato nell'età dei sistemi politici di massa (1918-1925). Bologna: Il Mulino, p397 
et seqq., 1996.  
25 On this Chamber, see Perfetti, Francesco, La Camera dei fasci e delle 
corporazioni. Roma: Bonacci, p196, 1991. 
26 Standing committees are not the only type of committee established in the 
three Chambers, namely, the French National Assembly, the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies, and the British House of Commons. For example, bicameral committees, 
special committees and committees of inquiry do exist in the three case studies, 
whereas the committee of the whole House is provided only in the House of Commons’ 
standing orders. However, the analysis in the present contribution is focused only on 
standing committees because these are the bodies most closely connected to the 
operation of the executive branch and thus are deemed to be particularly influential on 
the form of government. See in detail Fasone, Cristina, Sistemi di commissioni 
parlamentari e forme di governo. Padova: Cedam, p209 et seqq., 2012. 
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considerable expectation of endurance. Interestingly enough, the 
constitutionalisation of the rules on standing committees implies that, 
should their violation occur, it can be challenged before the Conseil 
constitutionnel, which can be asked to resolve disputes on the 
enforcement of parliamentary rules of procedure, even while the 
legislative process concerned is taking place. 
The Constitution (Art. 43) fixes the maximum number of standing 
committees, that is eight in each Chamber, plus the Committee on 
European affairs (Art. 88-4 Cost.), which does not participate in the 
national legislative process.27 Since 2008 standing committees have 
been involved in the mandatory examination and scrutiny of every bill 
prior to its debate in the House (Art. 43 Const.). Although the 
opportunity to set up a special committee on a bill upon request of the 
executive, or of the House, has been maintained following the 
constitutional reform of 2008, the default option for the examination of 
a bill now consists in relying on standing committees.  
Art. 42 Const., as amended in 2008, ensures that during the first 
reading the bill at stake cannot reach the House before the deadline of 
six weeks since its proposal has expired. Although for financing bills, 
social security financing bills and bills concerning a state of emergency 
such a secured timeframe is not granted, because of the nature of the 
bills and the need for fast-track procedures, the time reserve at the 
benefit of standing committees allows for the proper scrutiny of bills.28 
Since 2008, the French Constitution, for the very first time, also 
confers upon standing committees a general power to oversee and assess 
public policies by way of “missions” (Art. 51-2 Cost.); temporary bodies 
set up within a standing committee or between two or more standing 
committees. This provision impresses a “revolutionary” change in the 
role of the National Assembly’s standing committees, given the 
traditional understanding of the exercise of oversight powers in the 
French Parliament as a prerogative assigned to the House, but not to 
committees (see infra, section 4.1.). 
Following the marginalisation imposed on standing committees 
by the 1958 Constitution, the constitutional reform of 2008 enhances, 
at least on paper, the role of these parliamentary bodies in the National 
Assembly and in the inter-institutional relationship with the executive. 
                                                                                            
27 See Jancic, Davor, “The French Parliament: A European Scrutineer or 
National Actor?”. In, European Public Law, volume 19, n°1, p129-159, 2013. 
28 Other constitutional provisions on standing committees are examined in 
section 4.1., since they affect the relationship with the executive. 
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B. The structure of the committee system 
The committee system of the French National Assembly has been 
rather stable since 1958, and was affected by the setting up of two new 
standing committees only in 2009, following the constitutional reform. 
It is commonly agreed that a direct relationship between the size, 
the number and the strength of standing committees in parliament does 
exist: the smaller and more numerous standing committees are, the less 
the speaker of the House and political groups are likely to coordinate 
and to dominate standing committee activity.29 However, under these 
circumstances, the committee system becomes highly decentralised and 
fragmented, since each committee acts regardless of the other standing 
committees. Likewise, the size and the opportunity for a multiple 
committee membership are definitely significant for an assessment of 
the shape of a committee system. 
In Europe the French National Assembly is the Chamber with the 
lowest number of standing committees – only eight – compared to the 
number of MPs, 577 (Art. 24, section 3 Const.). Therefore, on average, 
a standing committee is composed of 70 MPs. Indeed, Art. 36 of the 
parliamentary rules fixes the maximum number of committee members 
at one eighth of the overall number of MPs (72), without setting a 
minimum threshold. Possibly the National Assembly’s committees are 
among the largest standing committees in Europe and of course, by 
being only eight, their level of specialization in public policy is modest.  
Although MPs are allowed to attend the meeting of other 
standing committees, the multiple membership in committee is 
forbidden and this does not favour the exchange of views and interaction 
between committees. The only exception is represented by the 
Committee on European Affairs, which is smaller in its size than the 
other standing committees (around 40 members) and is composed by 
members of the other standing committees because of its cross-sectional 
jurisdiction.  
Besides the case of the Committee on European Affairs, the rules 
of procedure do not make explicit any asymmetry in the committee 
system, although the membership of some committees can be considered 
as particularly prestigious, because of the power conferred. For 
                                                                                            
29 See Smith, Gordon, Politics in Western Europe. A comparative analysis, 3rd 
ed. New York: Holmes & Meier, p167, 1980, and Strøm, Kaare, “Parliamentary 
Committees in European Democracy”. In, Longley, Lawrence D. &  Davidson, Roger 
H., The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees. New York: Frank Cass, p30, 1998. 
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example, the Committee on Laws (Commission de Lois), which has a 
pivotal role in the legislative process by examining the 60-70 per cent 
of the overall bills assigned to the National Assembly,30 and the 
Committee on Finance (Commission de Finances), which enjoys a 
prominent role in the national budgetary procedures as well as in the 
European semester,31 are more powerful than others. 
 
C. The composition of standing committees 
In the three legislatures political groups are the points of reference 
for the appointment of committee members and the principle of 
proportionality is followed, aiming to mirror in committee the 
composition of the House.  
Once the quotas of seats in standing committees have been 
allotted to political groups, the groups designate their “candidates” as 
committee members and then three possible procedural options are in 
place: the appointment on the part of the speaker of the House, the 
appointment by a committee of selection, the appointment following the 
vote of the House. 
In the French National Assembly committee members are 
appointed by the speaker; a choice that allows to speed up the creation 
of standing committees and to review any proposal made by groups, 
favouring a balanced decision..The speaker acts as an arbiter in 
committees’ appointments, but is devoid of a substantial role to orient 
the decision. 
The most important position in a standing committee of this 
Chamber is that of the chairman, who is elected by the each committee 
from among its members. The chairman is assisted by a bureau 
composed of four vice-chairmen and four secretaries (Art. 39 rule).32 
The election of the members of the bureau – chairman included – takes 
place by simple majority; in particular the political affiliation of the 
chairmen has been subject to debate. The monopoly of the 
parliamentary majority over the committee chairmanship has been 
harshly criticized by the opposition especially in 1973, 1978 and 1981, 
                                                                                            
30 See Camby, Jean-Pierre, & Servent, Pierre, Le travail parlementaire sous la 
cinquième République, 5th ed., p70, 2011.  
31 See Bouhadana, Irène, Les commissions des finances des assemblées parlementaires 
françaises: origines, évolutions et enjeux. Paris: LGDJ, 2007.  
32 The conspicuous size of the committees’ bureau in the National Assembly can 
be explained by the large size of the standing committees. See Avril, Pierre & Gicquel, 
Jean, Droit parlementaire, 4th ed. Paris: Montchrestien, p108, 2010. 
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when the Prime Minister – who, as all the other members of the 
executive branch, cannot be an MP – proposed to assign the role of 
committee chairmen proportionally to the size of political groups.33 The 
fear of potential obstructionist conduct on the part of committee 
chairmen from the opposition has led to the refusal of any hypothesis of 
reform on this point. Thus, since 1980s, the parliamentary majority has 
always taken up all the committee chairmanships, except for the 
Committee of Finance whose chairman comes from the opposition 
bench, according to the rules of procedure.  
The office of committee chairman is considered a distinguished 
position in France, performed by the MPs with the greatest expertise 
and the richest cursus honorum, and showing a strong political accord 
with the Prime Minister.34 Moreover, the office of committee chairman 
seems somewhat inter-changeable with that of Minister, as confirmed 
by the institutional practice: many committee chairmen then become 
Ministers and vice versa. In addition the committee chairman is entitled 
to exercise on his own, or on behalf of the committee, specific 
prerogatives acknowledged by the Conseil constitutionnel.35 For example, 
committee chairmen are members ex officio of the Conference of 
Presidents, the body that sets the agenda of the National Assembly 
together with the Executive and gives directions to parliamentary 
business.36 
The rules of the National Assembly also provide the office of 
rapporteur, who is appointed by the chairman among the committee 
members to report on a bill or an item under examination by the 
committee and is usually chosen within the parliamentary majority.37 
                                                                                            
33 See Foyer, Jean, “Le président de commission parlementaire”. In, VV. AA., 
Mélanges en l’honneur de Pierre Avril. Paris: Montchrestien, p435 et seqq., 2001.  
34 See Türk, Pauline, Les commissions parlementaires permanentes, cit., p237.  
35 See the decision n. 69-37 DC, Conseil constitutionnel, 20th November 1969. A 
committee chairman can ask for an increase in the number of committee members (the 
decision is taken by the House) and can present oral questions on behalf of his 
committee. 
36 The Conference of Presidents is composed of the speaker, the vice-presidents, 
the committee chairmen, the president of political groups and the general rapporteur 
of the Committee on Finance. 
37 The general rapporteur of the Committee on Finance is appointed for the 
entire parliamentary term among the MPs of the majority. In the National Assembly, 
in 80 per cent of cases, an MP from the majority is appointed as rapporteur: see Türk, 
Pauline, Les commission parlementaires permanentes, cit., p285. According to Pierre, 
Eugène, Traité de droit politique électoral et parlementaire. Paris: Librairies-
imprimeries reunies, p901, 1919, the rapporteur is by nature an organ of the majority.  
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3.2. The Italian Chamber of Deputies 
 
A. Constitutional acknowledgment 
Compared to the French Constitution, the Italian fundamental 
charter of 1948 contains less detailed provisions about standing 
committees, although it confers on them significant prerogatives in the 
legislative process. 
Art. 72, 3rd section, Const. recognizes explicitly the option – thus, 
this is not an obligation – to set up standing committees only for the 
procedure in which they are allowed to pass laws on their own, which is 
quite a unique power granted to Italian parliamentary committees in 
comparative perspective.38 In other words, the Italian Constitution 
admits that the committees in the Italian Chamber of Deputies (as well 
as in the Senate) can pass legislation without the involvement of the 
House and on its behalf (sede legislativa or deliberante). The bill is 
examined, amended and approved by final vote directly in committee. 
The acknowledgment of such power finds a precedent in the power 
conferred upon the standing committees of the Chamber of Fasces and 
Corporations, but this occurred when an undemocratic regime was in 
place. 
However, in the new democratic regime this committee power is 
framed within a brand new constitutional settlement and limited by 
clear boundaries. For example, standing committees cannot act as 
autonomous legislators on constitutional and electoral bills, on bills of 
legislative delegation, as well as on budget bills (Art. 72, 4th section 
Const.). Moreover, at any time during this kind of procedure either the 
executive or one tenth of the MPs in the Chamber or one fifth of the 
committee members can ask for the remittal of the bill to the House.39 
In this hypothesis the Speaker of the Chamber assigns a bill to a 
committee only for the examination and amendments (sede referente), 
                                                                                            
38 On the basis of the Italian model, a similar power has been recognised in the 
standing committees of the Spanish Parliament, of the Greek Assembly, and of the 
Brazilian federal Congress. 
39 See Ciaurro, Gian Franco, “Commissioni parlamentari”. In, Enciclopedia 
giuridica, volume VII. Roma: Istituto delle Enciclopedia italiana, 1988, p. 8, and 
Traversa, Silvio, “La riserva di legge d’Assemblea”. In, Studi per il ventesimo 
anniversario dell’Assemblea costituente, volume V. Firenze: Vallecchi, p613 et seqq., 
1969.  
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which is the basic option offered by the Constitution (Art. 72, 1st section 
Const.).40 Afterwards, once the legislative process has started, it is 
always possible to change the position of a committee, from that of a 
committee in charge only for the examination of a bill to a committee 
(the same committee actually) acting as a legislator, and vice versa. 
As in the French Constitution, following the 2008 amendments, 
the Italian Constitution also fixed a fundamental guarantee for 
committees: a bill cannot be debated in the House if it has not been 
examined beforehand by a committee. Furthermore, such a provision on 
the compulsory examination of bills in committees is not commonly 
found elsewhere at constitutional level.41 
In spite of the fact that the Italian Constitution neither imposes 
the setting up of standing committees nor lists them, the institutional 
practice and the rules of procedure of both Chambers have led to the 
institutionalization of standing committees, whereas special committees 
have been an exception.42 
 
B. The structure of the committee system 
The number of standing committees in the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies has not be subjected to significant changes since 1920, and has 
increased from 11 to 14. After the adoption of the new rules of procedure 
in 1971,43 the main reform of the committee system, in 1987, aimed at 
contrasting the problem of its fragmentation. At that time each standing 
committee had developed an exclusive and symbiotic relationship with 
the Ministry competent on the subject-matter without any fruitful 
interplay with the other standing committees. The reason was self-
                                                                                            
40 The third option, which is infrequently used, is to assign the bill to a 
committee for its approval article by article, leaving just the final approval to the 
House (sede redigente). 
41 See Perna, Raffaele, “Le commissioni parlamentari al tempo del 
maggioritario”. In, Lupo, Nicola & Gianfrancesco, Eduardo, Le regole del diritto 
parlamentare nella dialettica tra maggioranza e opposizione. Roma: LUISS University 
Press, p141-142, 2007, who highlights that in Europe only the Italian, the Finnish, 
and the French Constitutions provide this obligation. 
42 See Decaro, Carmela, “La struttura delle Camere”. In, Martines, Temistocle, 
Silvestri, Gaetano, Decaro, Carmela, Lippolis, Vincenzo & Moretti, Raffaele, Diritto 
parlamentare. Milano: Giuffrè, p75-153, 2011. 
43 Indeed, both Chambers of the new Parliament elected in 1948 decided to re-
adopt the rules of procedure of the Italian Chamber of Deputies in the pre-fascist 
regime, albeit with adaptations to the new Constitution. The new rules of procedure 
were adopted only in 1971. 
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evident: most laws were passed directly by standing committees acting 
as “legislators”.44 
Against this status quo, in which every committee played its role 
alone and completely detached from the other parliamentary activities, 
the jurisdiction of standing committees has been revised in order to 
identify consistent and cross-sectional competences with reference to 
the portfolios allocated within the executive.45 Moreover, the 
participation of other standing committees, alongside the one 
competent on the subject-matter in the legislative process, has been 
promoted by providing that some of them shall issue (semi-binding) 
opinions on every bill (see infra). 
Compared to the standing committees of the French National 
Assembly, standing committees in the Italian Chamber are smaller in 
size, from 35 to 45 members each, since 630 MPs are allotted in 14 
committees.46 Likewise, also in the Italian Chamber, MPs – except the 
speaker – are obliged to participate in committee activities, but they 
must choose the membership of one committee only (Art. 19, section 3 
rules).47 
Following the reform of the rules of procedure in the 1980s, the 
committee system of the Italian Chamber of Deputies has become more 
integrated, more easily manageable, and in most procedures several 
committees are involved, although with different roles. The previous 
trend towards sectoralisation of committee activities and an exclusive 
relationship with “their” Ministry has been hindered. This does not 
mean, however, that no asymmetry features in the committee system. 
The Committee on EU Policies does not enjoy the same powers as the 
other committees in the legislative process, while it is very active on the 
scrutiny of EU draft legislation; some standing committees, like the 
                                                                                            
44 See Predieri, Alberto, “Parlamento 1975”. In, Predieri, Alberto, Il Parlamento 
nel sistema politico italiano. Milano: Giuffrè, p. 11 et seqq., 1975.  
45 See Berarducci, Elio, “La revisione delle competenze delle commissioni 
parlamentari”. In, Il Parlamento della Repubblica: organi, procedure, apparati. Roma: 
Camera dei deputati, p45 et seqq., 1987 and Letta,  Guido, “Le nuove competenze delle 
commissioni permanenti nel regolamento della Camera dei deputati”. In, Diritto e 
società, n°1, p123 et seqq., 1989.  
46 There are no rules setting the number of members of standing committees 
or thresholds as in France. 
47 However, MPs are allowed to replace a colleague of the same political group 
who has been appointed in the executive or a colleague limited to a committee meeting 
or to a bill. Such a replacement is decided by political groups, which control the 
committees’ composition and they have to inform the committee chairman. 
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Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Budget, are 
involved in the examination of every bill in order to assess, respectively, 
the compatibility with the Constitution and their financial effects. Under 
certain circumstances, their opinions are binding upon the other 
committees. If the latter do not comply with this opinion while acting 
in their capacity of legislator (sede legislativa or deliberante), the bill is 
immediately remitted to the examination of the House (Art. 93, section 
3 rules); if the bill is only examined and amended in committee, the lack 
of compliance with this opinion must be justified in the report prepared 
for the House (Articles 73, section 4, 74, section 3, and 75, section 2, 
rules). In particular, the Committee on Budget is somewhat the linchpin 
of the legislative process. Whenever its opinion on a bill reveals that 
there are not enough resources for its funding and the committee 
competent on the subject-matter disregards the position of the 
Committee on Budget, the conditions set in the opinion are 
automatically converted into amendments voted in the House. 
 
C. The composition of standing committees 
The standing committees of the Italian Chamber of Deputies are 
formed proportionally to the size of political in groups in the House 
(Art. 19, section 2 rules). Aiming to adjust the committees’ composition 
to possible changes of the political groups and of the majority in the 
Chamber, Art. 20, section 5 of the rules provides the renewal of 
committees after two years from the beginning of the parliamentary 
term. Previous committee members can either be confirmed in their 
positions or be replaced, depending on the changing landscape of 
political groups and on the needs to observe the principle of 
proportionality. Meanwhile, before such a renewal is carried out, the 
composition of standing committees may not, temporarily, mirror the 
composition of the House, for example because new groups have been 
established or because some groups have withdrawn their confidence in 
the executive, or a new executive is appointed without prior elections, 
as happened during the 16th parliamentary term (2008-2013). Thus it 
can be that the majority in the House is provisionally the minority in 
one or more committees. 
Although the role played by political groups in the designation of 
committee members is definitely crucial, the speaker has the final word. 
Indeed, the speaker is responsible for the allotment of committee seats, 
checks whether the proportion between groups is effectively respected, 
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and is allowed to intervene to balance the representation of groups in 
committees.48 
The chairmen of the standing committees are elected by absolute 
majority among the committee members, and thus are “men of the 
majority”. Usually chairmen are chosen among those affiliated to one of 
the parties within the ruling coalition, but different from the party that 
supports the relevant Minister, as to provide a more accurate and 
pervasive control within the coalition. Sometimes committee chairmen 
can shift from the majority, at the time they were elected, to the 
opposition, as a consequence of developments occurring within the 
ruling coalition. 
 
 
3.3. The British House of Commons 
 
A. Constitutional acknowledgment 
In the UK, talking about the constitutional acknowledgment of 
standing committees can appear as non-sense because of the lack of a 
Constitution conceived as a unique binding document endowed with 
great endurance over the time (i.e. its rigidity). However, as many 
scholars, and even judges, have pointed out, besides the constitutional 
conventions that certainly form part of the unwritten British 
Constitution, this Constitution is also composed of several Acts of 
Parliament enjoying a constitutional status.49 Many of these Acts affect 
the form of government – e.g. the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 and the 
Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 – and the exercise of public powers. 
Not one of these Acts contains a reference to the standing 
committees of the House of Commons, presumably because, in homage 
to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, which has been a 
                                                                                            
48 Cozzoli, Vito, I gruppi parlamentari nella transizione del sistema politico-
istituzionale. Le riforme regolamentari della Camera dei deputati nella XIII 
legislatura. Milano: Giuffrè, p118-119, 2002, mentions several occasions in which the 
speaker has stepped in to tackle cases of violation of the principle of proportionality 
and, in particular, the over-representation of the mixed parliamentary group 
(composed of the MPs not registered in any other group).  
49 See Turpin, Colin & Tomkins, Adam, British Government and the 
Constitution, 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p139, 2007, according 
to whom “although our constitution is frequently described as «unwritten», almost all 
of it is written down, somewhere”. This opinion was also shared by Justice Laws of 
High Court in Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, [2003] QB 151 in 
2002.  
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landmark principle of British constitutional law for decades,50 a 
Parliament cannot bind its successor by dictating how to structure its 
internal organization. However, the lack of recognition for the role of 
standing committees in constitutional documents does not necessarily 
entail that they are weak parliamentary bodies. Rather, sometimes a 
constitutional clause that fixes the number of standing committees and 
their jurisdiction is really intrusive of the constitutional autonomy of a 
legislature and can aim to contrast the enlargement of the standing 
committees’ number and powers. 
 
B. The structure of the committee system 
After the “revolution” occurred in 1979 and the creation, for the 
first time, of select committees in the House of Commons, the committee 
system has not been affected by significant transformations, although 
the debate on how to improve it is still ongoing.  
The select committees that are the subject of the present 
contribution (S.O. 144 et seqq.) are: the 19 in charge of overseeing the 
expenditure, the administration and the policies implemented by the 
different governmental departments, also called “departmental select 
committees”, given their close relationship with the executive (S.O. 
152); and, the unicameral select committees with a cross-sectional 
jurisdiction, like the Public Accounts Committee, the European 
Scrutiny Committee, the Public Administration Committee, the 
Environmental Audit Committee and the Liaison Committee, the body 
where all select committees are represented by their chairmen.  
Other unicameral, though non-permanent, committees are the 
public bills committees, which are set up ad hoc for the examination of a 
bill and are dissolved as soon as the bill is finally approved.51 To some 
extent the public bills committees complement the activity of select 
                                                                                            
50 See, for instance, Dicey, Albert V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution. London-New York: Macmillan & co., 1889. 
51 See Thompson, Louise, “More of the Same or a Period of Change? The Impact 
of Bill Committees in the Twenty-First Century House of Commons”. In, 
Parliamentary Affairs, volume 66, n°3, p459-479, 2013. Blackburn, Robert & Kennon, 
Andrew, (Griffith and Ryle on) Parliament. Functions, Practice, and Procedures, 2nd 
ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, p385, 2003, highlight that the original denomination 
of the public bills committees was “standing committees”, which was a misnomer, given 
their temporary nature. Possibly the name standing committees derives from the 
practice of the MPS to stand while speaking, a practice also observed during the 
debates in the House. 
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committees: the former are fully involved in the legislative process, 
whereas the latter exercise the oversight function. 
On the whole, in the House of Commons, the number of select 
committees is remarkable if compared to the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies and even more so to the French National Assembly. The 650 
MPs are not obliged to become member of a select committee.52 
Moreover, MPs fulfilling the role of whips or an office in the executive 
branch are excluded from select committees by law in order to avoid 
conflicts of interest, since select committees are established primarily to 
control the performance of the government. They can be heard before a 
select committee, but they are prevented from being members. Rather, 
select committees are composed of backbenchers and have a very small 
size – from 11 to 14 seats – fixed for each select committee directly by 
the Standing Orders.53 Because of the limited number of seats available 
in the select committees, some backbenchers remain outside the select 
committee system: in other words, there are not enough seats for all the 
MPs potentially interested in membership of a select committee. The 
proposals of the Modernization Committee, which is periodically 
appointed to study reforms of the Standing Orders, to increase the size 
of select committees to (at least) 15 seats – so as to allow another 50 
MPs to participate in select committee activities – to date have been 
disregarded.54 
The size of select committees is kept deliberately small in order to 
have highly cohesive bodies able to carry out in-depth examination of 
departmental performance and whose members, who are often 
confirmed in their position term after term, are definitely expert on the 
subject-matter. In the House of Commons there is a strong belief that 
small standing committees are better able to perform their tasks 
                                                                                            
52 Following the approval of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies 
Act 2011 the number of seats in the House of Commons will be decreased from 650 to 
600 starting from the next parliamentary term. 
53 By contrast, the public bill committees are usually composed of 16 to 50 MPs, 
depending on the importance of the bill. The more the bill is significant the bigger is 
the committee appointed, up to the point of summoning the committee of the whole 
House. 
54 Nonetheless, the overall number of MPs participating in select committees 
has increased throughout the years from 222 in the 1978-1979 session to 326 in the 
2007-2008 session. See McKay, William & Johnson, Charles W., Parliament & 
Congress. Representation and scrutiny in the Twenty-first century, 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p559, table 8.1., 2012.  
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effectively, as confirmed also by the statements of some committee 
chairmen, who are in favour of the limitation of committee size.55  
There is no hierarchy among select committees that can be 
inferred by any rule: the official powers of select committees to oversee 
the executive action are perfectly symmetric. However, the Public 
Accounts Committee is acknowledged de facto a peculiar status, as the 
first select committee established and usually chaired by an MP from 
the opposition bench. Its recommendations to the executive are taken 
into consideration much more so than those of other committees.56  
 
C. The composition of standing committees 
It has been said that “The beauty of the select committee system is that 
it is the only area of activity in this House at this time where the writ of the 
Whips office does not run. Once one is on a select committee, one is on it for the 
Parliament (…)”.57 Whosoever sits in a select committee, when 
overseeing the executive, is asked to act for the whole Chamber and not 
on behalf of its political group. This is why, by contrast to the process 
of appointment of the public bills committees – where also members of 
the executive branch seat –, carried out by an ad hoc Committee of 
Selection, select committee members must be confirmed in their 
position by the vote of the House, following the proposal by the 
Committee of Selection.  
The involvement of the House in this procedure is crucial. For 
example, in 2001 the House of Commons refused to confirm the 
designation by the Committee of Selection of the members of the select 
Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Transport as long as the former 
chairmen of these committees were not included in the list of appointees. 
It appeared that the two former chairmen were victims of their group 
for their behaviour, and were considered too critical of the executive. 
                                                                                            
55 See the speech of the chairman of the House of Commons’ Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committee, Hon. Peter Luff, during the session 2007-2008, (HC 
Deb (2007-8), meeting of 28th October 2008, 481 c. 852), who complained about the 
fact that his committee, with 14 members, was too big to be ruled.  
56 According to Turpin, Colin & Tomkins, Adam, British Government and the 
Constitution, 7th ed., cit., p641-642, the greatest part of the Public Accounts 
Committee recommendations are accepted by the executive. 
57 See the speech by Hon. Diane Abbott, House of Commons, Commons 
Hansard, 7th July 1998, col936. 
         
 
Cristina Fasone 
The influence of standing Committes 
on the forms of Government 
 
 - 37 -    N. 1/2017 
Once included in the list, the select committees have been finally 
appointed by the House.58  
The chairman of a select committee is definitely in a powerful 
position. On the one hand, by contrast to the French and the Italian 
experiences, select committees do not elect either a bureau or 
rapporteurs on the issues under consideration. The reports in select 
committees are usually drafted by committee clerks as a chairman’s 
report. On the other hand, the procedure for the appointment of a select 
committee chairman is regulated in detail by the Standing Orders and 
involves almost all parliamentary bodies; an element that highlights the 
prominence given to select committee chairmen. First of all the speaker, 
at the beginning of the parliamentary term, allots the positions as select 
committee chairman proportionally to political groups, according to 
their size. In other words, the speaker fixes how many chairs are granted 
to each group and this distribution must be approved by the House.59 
Afterward a competition between MPs starts within each group for the 
designation as a committee chairman. Interestingly, the election of 
committee chairmen is finally decided by House, unlike the rule in the 
French National Assembly and the Italian Chamber of Deputies, where 
the chairmen are chosen by the committee itself.60   
S.O. 122C, introduced in 2010, provides, for the first time and only 
for select committees, that a committee chairman can be removed by 
way of a vote of no-confidence and thus assumes the existence of a 
confidence relationship between committee members and their 
chairman. The new provision might jeopardise the usual modus operandi 
of select committees as highly autonomous and independent bodies, 
albeit composed of MPs.61 It runs counter to what the leader of the 
House of Commons stated a few years ago about the profile of committee 
chairmen: once appointed “they go native”, as if they were not affiliated 
to a political party. If a committee chairman was removed through a 
resolution of no-confidence an unusual asymmetry would arise. 
                                                                                            
58 See Turpin, Colin & Tomkins, Adam, British Government and the 
Constitution, 7th ed., cit., p614-615. 
59 The liberal-democrats obtained for the first time the chairmanship of a select 
committee only in 1997. 
60 To become a candidate as a committee chairman the MP has to gain the 
support of at least 15 members of his group or 10 per cent of the MPs elected in the 
same party at the latest elections (S.O. n. 122B, section 8, amended after the elections 
in 2010). 
61 See McKay, William & Johnson Charles W., Parliament and Congress, cit., 
p366. 
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Committee members do not elect their chairmen, but they can remove 
him; by contrast, the House elects him, but has no say in his removal. 
It is important to notice that the introduction of this provision in 
the Standing Orders in 2010 reflects the structural shift from a party 
government to a coalition government, following the election. The 
wording of S.O. 122C makes this clear: there is no reference to the 
majority and opposition as in most other Standing Orders, but rather to 
the “largest party represented” and “another party”, whenever the 
consensus lacks. This element confirms that committee composition and 
chairmanship are closely connected to the operation of the form of 
government and to its change.  
 
 
4. The evolution of the form of government in the light of the changes of 
standing committees’ powers 
 
4.1. A brief overview of the main developments of the British, Italian and 
French forms of government  
 
It has been observed that in a parliamentary form of government, 
grounded on the confidence relationship between the legislature and the 
executive, the latter is deemed to be a sort of “steering committee” in 
parliament.62 In other words, it seems inherent that the executive can 
lead parliamentary activities, according to its political programme. 
However, even when the executive dominates the parliament, 
parliamentary bodies can influence, amend, and even replace the content 
of the bills tabled by the executive.63 
                                                                                            
62 See Elia, Leopoldo, “Il Governo come comitato direttivo del Parlamento”. In, 
Civitas, n°4, p59-66, 1951. Parliamentary systems are “fused power systems”, between 
the legislature and the executive. 
63 Amongst the many classifications of parliaments proposed by scholars, see 
Norton, Philip, “The Legislative Powers of Parliament”. In, Flinterman, Cees, 
Heringa, Aalt W. & Waddington, Lisa, The Evolving Role of Parliaments in Europe. 
Antwerpen: Maklu Uitgevers, p15-35, 1994, on the influence of parliaments on 
policymaking. In parliamentary forms of government the bills introduced by the 
executive are those that show the highest rate of success in terms of approval, though 
they might be heavily amended in parliament. 
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There are, however, several variations of parliamentary systems.64 
The British system, which for centuries has been a model of 
parliamentarism, based on party government, a strong Prime Minister, 
and the first-past the post electoral system, has been affected by some 
transformations in the last few years. The evolution partly derives from 
changes in politics and in the party system and partly from institutional 
reforms.  
The 2010 general elections led to the formation of one of the few 
coalition governments (between conservatives and liberal democrats) in 
British constitutional history with significant consequences for the 
operation of parliament.65 The simple distinction between majority and 
opposition had to be updated to a situation in which two parties rule 
together.66 Even the chairmanship of select committees has been 
influenced by such political change (see supra, section 3.3.) and, 
interestingly, the strengthening of select committees is one of the 
objectives that the coalition government aims to fulfill (point 16 of the 
Coalition Agreement, on government transparency). 
Furthermore, in 2011 three significant parliamentary Acts 
entered into force. The Parliamentary Voting System and 
Constituencies Act 2011 aimed at changing the electoral system from 
plurality to the alternative vote system and at reducing the number of 
Commons. It failed for the first part, because of the negative outcome of 
a referendum, but succeeded in introducing a cut of 50 MPs from the 
next parliamentary term onwards. The European Union Act 2011, 
following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, has list a series 
of cases in which parliamentary assent is required whenever certain 
clauses of the European Treaties are used: this is a condition for the 
executive to act upon. However, even more important for the British 
form of government is the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011, which 
“rationalized” it compared to the previous discipline based on 
constitutional conventions. Not only has the House of Commons a fixed 
                                                                                            
64 See Bradley, Anthony W. & Pinelli, Cesare, “Parliamentarism”. In, Rosenfeld, 
Michel & Sajò, Andràs, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p628-648, 2012.  
65 The Standing Orders for public business in the House of Commons were 
profoundly changed by the new Parliament in 2010 compared to those in force before 
the elections, aiming to adapt parliament to the new political reality. 
66 On the impact of the coalition government on the British constitutional 
system, see House of Lords, Inquiry into the constitutional operation of coalition 
government – Written and oral evidence. London: Select Committee on the 
Constitution, p59-101, 10th December 2013 (Robert Hazell’s written evidence). 
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term of five years but the hypotheses of an early dissolution are clearly 
fixed. The case for a self-dissolution of the Chamber by a two-thirds 
majority has been introduced, as well as the possibility for the House of 
Commons to adopt a motion of no confidence against the government 
followed by a (express) vote of confidence in favour of a new cabinet, 
which allows the House to avoid an early dissolution. Although possibly 
it is too early to assess the effects of these Acts, in principle the position 
of the House of Commons vis-à-vis the executive seems reinforced. As a 
consequence, the debate on the performance and prospects for 
enhancement of select committees has also arisen vigorously, as a way 
to ride the transformation occurring in the relationship between the 
executive and the parliament.67 
By contrast, until the end of the last century, the functioning of 
the Italian Parliament did not follow the usual rationale of 
parliamentary forms of government, according to which the executive 
leads parliamentary activities. Rather, due to the fragmentation and the 
polarization of the party system and to the international constraints 
upon Italian politics, very unstable governments – which remained in 
office from six months to one year – were unable to rule parliament and 
were in fact submitted to its “diktat”.68 
During the first forty years of the Italian Republic, when the 
communist party was kept apart from the Executive branch but not 
from the legislative process, standing committees represented the very 
centres of legislative production:69 it suffices to say that in each of the 
first ten parliamentary terms (from 1948 to 1992) the greater part of the 
Acts passed received their final approval in committees without 
reaching the Floor of Houses.70 Standing committees were the place 
                                                                                            
67 See Brazier, Alex & Fox, Ruth, “Reviewing Select Committee Tasks and 
Modes of Operation”. In, Parliamentary Affairs, volume, 62, n°4, p354-369, 2011, and 
Russell, Meg & Benton, Meghan, Selective Influence. The Policy Impact of House of 
Commons Select Committees. London: The Constitution Unit, UCL, p18 et seqq., June 
2011.  
68 On fragmentation and polarization of party systems, see Sartori, Giovanni, 
Parties and party system: A framework for analysis, reprinted ed., Essex: ECPR, p80 
et seqq., 2005[1976]. On the factors affecting government’s duration, see Fischer, 
Jörn, Dowding, Keith & Dumont, Patrick, “The duration and durability of cabinet 
ministers”. In, International Political Science Review, volume 33, p505-519, 2012. 
69 See Russo, Federico & Verzichelli, Luca, “Parliaments and Citizens in Italy: 
An Unfilled Gap”. In, The Journal of Legislative Studies, volume 12, n°3/4, p351-367, 
2012. 
70 See. Gianniti, Luigi & Lupo, Nicola, Corso di diritto parlamentare, 2nd ed. 
Bologna: Il Mulino, p238, 2013. 
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where, in the atmosphere of the Cold War and behind closed doors, 
everyone could be included and actively involved in the legislative 
decision-making process. All compromises, sometimes even very 
controversial ones, and often with the Executive relegated to a passive 
role, were weaved by committees oriented towards the consensual and 
the most inclusive logic.71 The result was an explosion of the legislative 
production, often originating from parliamentary bills: hundreds of 
super-sectional laws, mirroring the jurisdiction of standing committees 
and making an enormous increase to public expenditure. 
However, at the beginning of the 1990s the collapse of the party 
system and the change of the electoral laws produced a majoritarian 
turn in the functioning of the political system, without any 
constitutional amendment and maintaining the same form of 
government. Although the legal norms – included the parliamentary 
rules of procedure – were not substantially restyled, the real operation 
of the relationship between parliament and government changed 
dramatically.  
The Italian political context has shifted away from the time when 
confidential agreements achieved in committees were functional to 
accommodate a highly fragmented and polarised political debate, in the 
absence of an alternative for the composition of the executive. Nowadays 
coalitions are formed before the election and the system has moved 
towards a majoritarian logic, in the House as well as in committees, with 
a stronger role for the Executive in the legislative process compared to 
the past. Evidence of this evolution is given by the fact that the number 
of Acts directly approved by committees dropped substantially.72 This 
does not imply that standing committees have lost any role in 
policymaking; they have been able to adapt and find new ways to 
influence the legislative process (see infra, Section 4.2.). 
Finally French semipresidentialism is in many regards a hybrid 
form of government: on the one hand, the President of the Republic, 
who is directly elected by people, is at the same time the Head of State 
and the Head of the executive branch and, as in the United States, 
                                                                                            
71 See Pizzorno, Alessandro, “Opposition in Italy”. In Government and 
Opposition, volume 32, n°4, p647-656, 1997. 
72 See, for instance, during the fifth parliamentary term (1968-1972) 78% of bills 
were approved ultimately in committees (at least in one of the two Houses), whereas 
during the fifteenth parliamentary term (2006-2008) the percentage dropped to 11%. 
However, during the latest part of the sixteenth parliamentary term (2008-2013), 
during the Monti government (2011-2013), which was supported by a wide coalition 
in parliament, the number of bills directly approved in committees rose to 17 %.  
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cannot even enter the Parliament; on the other, the Prime Minister, who 
is appointed by the President of the Republic, cannot operate without 
the confidence of the National Assembly.73 
Up to the end of the twentieth century, however the French 
National Assembly was voluntarily put under the dominance of the 
Prime Minister and the government. The constitutional design of the 
French Fifth Republic was aimed to avoid any possible repetition of the 
experience of the Third and Fourth Republic, founded on a 
parliamentary system clearly affected by governmental instability. 
Therefore, the legislative competence of the Parliament (domain 
de la loi) has been limited, in favour of the rule-making power of the 
executive (Ar. 37 Const.); the order of business of the National Assembly 
was defined by the executive (Art. 48 Const.); the approval of 
parliamentary resolutions was precluded; the government can use the 
blocked vote (Art. 44 Const.)74 and the accelerated procedure (Art. 49, 
section 3 Const.).75 
Only by the mid-1990s, initially by amending the rules of the 
National Assembly, has the parliament been gradually empowered.76 
                                                                                            
73 Some authors, for example Lauvaux, Philippe, Parlementarisme rationalisé 
et stabilité du pouvoir executive. Bruxelles: Bruylant,  p52, 1988, tends to compare 
French semipresidentialism to a highly rationalized parliamentary system; others 
highlight its sui generis nature: see Elgie, Robert, “What is semi-presidentialism and 
where it is found?”. In, Elgie, Robert & Moestrup, Sophia, Semipresidentialism outside 
Europe. A comparative Study. London-New York: Routledge, p. 1 et seqq., 1997. Linz, 
Juan J., “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy? Does it Make a Difference?”. In, 
Linz, Juan J. & Valenzuela, Arturo, The Failure of Presidential Democracy. 
Comparative Perspectives, volume I. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p3-
89, 1994, includes French semipresidentialism amongst the systems based on a dual 
executive. 
74 The government can ask the National Assembly to adopt just with one vote 
the entire text of a bill or a part thereof. All amendments are precluded, except those 
tabled or accepted by the government itself. 
75 If subject to the accelerated procedure a bill is almost immediately adopted 
because the bill on which the government has put a question of confidence is deemed 
automatically approved unless one tenth of the MPs tables a motion of no confidence 
that is then passed by the majority (of the members) of the National Assembly. Such a 
procedure is very unlikely to lead to the resignation of the government (only a 
minority government can be defeated by way of the accelerated procedure). Moreover, 
since 1958 only one government has resigned, in 1962, because a motion of no 
confidence was passed. 
76 Of course, compared to other legislature, like the U.S. Congress, the power 
of the National Assembly still remains weak, but considering the point of departure in 
1958, the Assembly has been considerably strengthened. 
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Indeed, the first changes concerned the strengthened power of the 
committee on finance over budgetary issue and the control of the 
legislative implementation by standing committees: the main tool for 
empowering the Assembly was by means of its committees.77 A decade 
later a major input towards reinforcing the legislature was found in the 
“presidentisalization” of the form of government achieved by the 
constitutional reform of 2000 and in its following “re-
parliamentarization” by the constitutional reform of 2008.78 The former 
matched the duration of the presidential mandate – seven years – to that 
of the National Assembly – five years –, thus trying to avoid the risk of 
cohabitation, and providing for parliamentary elections after 
presidential elections (loi constitutionelle n. 2000-964). Constitutional law 
n. 2008-724 has tried to re-balance the position of the parliament 
towards a very powerful President of the Republic.79 For example, the 
order of business of the National Assembly has become partagé between 
the government and the Conference of the Presidents, and in addition 
to the traditional parliamentary function a new one has been added: to 
control and assess public policies (Art. 24 Const.). Above all, by way of 
constitutional amendments, the “re-parliamentarization” has entailed an 
extension of standing committees’ power in the legislative process and 
to oversee the action of the executive. 
 
 
4.2. The transformation of standing committees’ powers in the legislative 
process 
 
It is well-known that, to date, in the British House of Commons 
the role of select committees in amending government bills has been 
almost inexistent. In principle the Standing Orders would allow the 
                                                                                            
77 See Avril, Pierre & Giquel, Jean, Droit parlementaire, cit., p303-304. 
78 On the constitutional reform of 2000, see Colliard, Jean-Claude, “Une 
confirmation de l’évolution présidentialist de l’Exécutif”. In, Revue politique et 
parlementaire, volume 10/12, p10, 2007; on the constitutional reform of 2008, 
interpreted as pursuing a “re-parliamentarisation” of the form of government, see 
Gicquel, Jean, “La reparlementarisation: une perspective d’evolution”. In, Pouvoirs, 
n°126, p47-59, 2008. 
79 See Costa, Olivier, Schnatterer, Tinette & Squarcioni, Laure, “Peut-on 
revaloriser le parlement français? Le regard des députés sur la revision 
constitutionnelle de 2008 et les réformes souhaitables” In, Les Essais – Jean Jaurès 
Foundation, n°5, 2012, on how the 2008 constitutional reform has been perceived by 
MPs, showing conflicting views on its outcomes. 
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participation of select committees in the legislative process as 
committees in charge of reviewing and amending government bills. 
However in practice ad hoc public bills committees or the Committee of 
the Whole House have been preferred. In spite of the greater amount of 
time spent in the scrutiny of government bills and the wide use of the 
procedure to take evidence after 2006, the poor performance of public 
bills committees in shaping legislation has raised the question of 
whether select committees would be much more suitable in carrying out 
this task, given their permanent nature and the expertise of its members. 
Except for a few remarkable examples, like the Hunting Bill, public bills 
committees remain largely unable to shape legislation: the introduction 
of oral and written evidence in committees has reinforced legislative 
scrutiny, but the executive has reacted by introducing a huge number of 
amendments during the report stage, which follows the committee 
stage, aiming at responding to committees’ scrutiny.80 
A very gradual and still partial transformation of the role of select 
committees in the legislative process has occurred anyway. Occasionally 
bills have been assigned for legislative scrutiny to select committees and 
the number has slightly increased throughout the years, from three in 
the 2005-2006 session to six in the 2007-2008 session, and then has 
remained quite stable.81 
Even more significant is possibly the present involvement of 
select committees in pre-legislative scrutiny on government bills, that 
is at an earlier stage of the legislative process, before the bill is officially 
tabled in the House of Commons. This has happened in a systematic way 
and, although select committees are not able to control the final 
legislative output (except for the implementation of legislation), by 
means of pre-legislative scrutiny they have become able to orient some 
fundamental choices of the executive in policymaking.82 
Likewise the history of the standing committees of the French 
National Assembly has been characterized by a long-standing 
                                                                                            
80 For an in depth examination of public bills committees in the House of 
Commons, see Thompson, Louise, “More of the same or a period of change?”, cit., p19, 
2012, who points out that the impact of parliament, by means of public bills 
committees, on government bills is “perhaps more negligible today (…) than it was in 
the previous years”, although their overall activity has increased. 
81 See McKay, William & Johnson, Charles W., Parliament and Congress, cit. 
p362. 
82 On select committees’ pre-legislative scrutiny, see Brazier, Alex, Kalitowski, 
Susanna, Rosenblatt, Gemma &. Korris, Matt, Law in the Making: Influence and 
Change in the Legislative Process. London: Hansard Society, 2008. 
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marginalization since 1958, followed by a later enhancement. A 
significant redress for standing committees has derived from the 
constitutional reform of 2008. As mentioned, the first signal of a 
committees’ revenge was launched by the reform of the rules of 
procedure in the mid-1990s, which however was not strictly focused on 
the legislative process. 
By contrast, Constitutional law n. 2008-724, organic law of 15th 
April 2009 on the application of Articles 34-1, 39 and 44 Const., and the 
amendments to the National Assembly’s rules of procedure seem to have 
changed the landscape. 
Not only does Art. 42, section 4 Const. reserve on any bill 
assigned at first reading six weeks for legislative scrutiny on the part of 
the standing committee competent on the subject-matter. A 
“revolution” is carried out in the way the legislative process is conceived, 
traditionally as government-centred. Since 2008 new Art. 42, section 1 
Const. states that the House examines government and private 
members’ bills on the basis of the text passed by the committee to which 
it was referred rather than, as it had been up until then, on the bill as 
presented by the government. Thus standing committees can adopt 
amendments which are immediately effective upon the bill concerned, 
although the House can change it further. This new committee 
prerogative has had as a corollary the acknowledgment on the part of 
the Conseil constitutionnel of the executive power to attend all committee 
meetings dealing with legislative scrutiny, aiming to ensure that its own 
bills are not overturned by committees.83 To safeguard the action of the 
executive some bills are excluded from being directly revised in 
committees – although during the committee stage amendments can be 
tabled and passed –, namely constitutional revision bills, financing bills, 
social security financing bills. 
Moreover, the pivot of the legislative process in the National 
Assembly is the rapporteur.84 The rapporteur, an MP from the majority 
(see supra, section 3), represents the standing committee in the House, 
who can table amendments and reply to the Minister. It has been 
demonstrated that, even before the constitutional reform of 2008, 80 per 
                                                                                            
83 See the decision of the Conseil constitutionnel n. 2009-579 DC of 9th April 2009 
on the Loi organique relative à l'application des articles 34-1, 39 et 44 de la Constitution. 
84 See Loquet, Patrick, Les commissions parlementaires permanents de la Ve 
République. Paris: PUF, p37, 1981, and Cahoua, Paul, “Les commissions lieu du travail 
legislative”. In, Pouvoirs, n°34, p43, 1985. 
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cent of committee amendments tabled in the House derived from the 
rapporteur.85 
Although leading to similar outcomes – the retention and the 
preservation of standing committee powers – the evolution of the 
“legislative function” of standing committees in the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies has followed a different path of development to the two 
previous Chambers. After 1994 the shift from a legislature based on 
standing committees, acting as autonomous legislators, to committees 
in charge “only” for the examination and amendment of bills, could have 
undermined the role of these parliamentary bodies in the legislative 
process (see supra, section 4.1.). Evidence of this risk comes from the 
way the parliamentary agenda and business are set, defined by the 
Conference of Groups Chairpersons (in agreement with the 
government) by special majority or, lacking this majority, by the 
Speaker. 
Standing committees must simply adapt their schedule to the 
House order of business without having a say in the Chamber’s agenda. 
Nor are the provisions of the rules of procedure that provide for a 
minimum timeframe for legislative scrutiny enforced. The committee 
stage can be de facto stopped at any moment whether the report on a bill 
has been drafted or not, and the rapporteur has to be given the mandate 
to report to the House. In principle, during the committee stage, Italian 
standing committees have always enjoyed the power that the 
committees of the French National Assembly gained from 2008: they 
can amend whatever bill, which is examined in the House according to 
a text passed by committees. However, according to the rules of 
procedure of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, if the bill starts to be 
examined by the House without the completion of the committee report, 
all the work previously done by the committee in amending the bill and 
on the report is lost and the text is considered by the House according 
to the wording of the bill originally presented. Whether such an 
outcome can be considered consistent with Art. 72, 1st section Const., 
which makes the committee stage mandatory (see above, section 3.2.), is 
a matter of discussion. 
A second major concern is represented by the practice of adopting 
maxi-amendments (maxi-emendamenti), particularly on decree-laws, 
which are enacted by the executive in extraordinary circumstances of 
                                                                                            
85 See Colliard, Jean-Claude, “Le débat des projects de loi sur le texte adopté en 
commission”. In, Camby, Jen-Pierre, Fraissex, Patrick, & Gicquel Jean, La revision de 
2008: une nouvelle Constitution?. Paris: Dalloz, p197-202, 2011. 
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necessity and urgency, come immediately into force, and must be 
converted into a parliamentary Act within 60 days otherwise lose their 
effects retroactively (Art. 77 Const.).86 A maxi-amendment, which is 
composed of one article divided into thousands sections and aims to 
replace the entire content of a bill, is always associated with a question 
of confidence put forward by the executive on the maxi-amendment 
itself. Thus, if the maxi-amendment is rejected the government has to 
resign. The “explosive mixture” of a maxi-amendment plus the question 
of confidence also has another procedural effect: should a question of 
confidence be raised, all the tabled amendments – also those of the 
principal committee – are precluded.87 Therefore, even if the committee 
stage is concluded, the committee report is adopted and the House 
examines the bill (or the bill that converts the decree-law into law) as 
amended by the relevant committee, the maxi-amendment tabled 
together with the question of confidence can annul the outcomes of the 
committee work. 
Yet, in spite of this result, it has been noticed that, on the one 
hand, when the committee stage has not been completed, the 
amendments adopted in committee and not transposed into the text for 
the House are inserted later on into the bill, in the House, for example 
as committee amendments. The principal standing committees, indeed, 
take part in the legislative process in the House, through a delegation 
of nine committee members (comitato dei 9), which of course enhances its 
influence compared to what happens in the British House of Commons 
and the French National Assembly. 
On the other hand, even if a maxi-amendment is tabled and 
adopted, usually most of the changes made during the committee stage 
to the original bill are maintained in the final text as well as other 
committee amendments presented in the House.88 
                                                                                            
86 The unlawful use or, better, the abuse of decree-laws has been challenged by 
the Constitutional Court (and the President of the Republic has severely criticized the 
practice, in particular in 2011): see the decisions n. 360/1996 and 22/2012. However, 
the number of decree-laws does not seem to decrease. 
87 On maxi-amendments, see in detail, Piccirilli, Giovanni, L’emendamento nel 
processo di decisione parlamentare. Padova: Cedam, p261 et seqq., 2008.  
88 Data have been collected about the goverment bills passed during the 
sixteenth parliamentary term (2008-2013) by a joint research group between the 
Centro di Studi sul Parlamento at LUISS Guido Carli of Rome, and the Law 
Department, at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa. The first outcomes of 
the research were presented on the occasion of a seminar on “Il procedimento 
legislativo tra Governo “legislatore” e Parlamento “emendatore” [The legislative 
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Because of the new political context and the majoritarian turn, the 
influence of standing committees is shown in a more indirect and hidden 
way compared to the past. The role of standing committees has reacted 
to the (informal) transformation of the form of government. 
 
 
4.3. The transformation of the oversight function of standing committees 
 
While the standing committees of the Italian Chamber of Deputies 
are still quite influential in the legislative process, their exercise of the 
oversight function has always been rather weak and the situation has 
become worse since the turning point of 1992-1994. In fact, the 
oversight function of the Italian Parliament in general has always been 
underused: oversight tools had been provided by the rules of procedure 
but exploited in only a limited way.89  
Although they are devoid of the power to conduct an inquiry – 
which the Constitution assigns as obligatory to temporary, unicameral 
or bicameral, committees composed proportionally of the House (Art. 
82 Const.), – standing committees can start fact-finding investigations, 
can carry out hearings, ask for specific documents, and devote part of 
their time to parliamentary questions.90 An improvement in the way the 
traditional oversight tools are applied in the Chamber derives from the 
need to oversee the conduct of the government in EU affairs. Ministers 
are more and more often asked to appear before standing committees 
(as well as in the House) to explain the Italian position on certain 
European legislative dossiers, and prior and after Council of Ministers 
and European Council’s meetings.91 Likewise the “European activities” 
                                                                                            
process between the legislative power of the executive and the amending power of the 
parliament], organised on 21st May 2010 at the Sant’Anna School on Advanced 
Studies, Pisa. 
89 See Manzella, Andrea, I controlli parlamentari. Milano: Giuffrè, 1970 and 
Chimenti, Carlo, Il controllo parlamentare nell’ordinamento italiano. Milano: Giuffrè, 
1974. 
90 Recently, on 26th June 2013, by way of a new interpretation of the rules of 
procedure provided by the Committee on Rules (Giunta per il regolamento) of the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies, standing committees have been allowed the possibility to hear 
appointees to governmental positions, either using informal hearings or by providing 
internet broadcasting of the hearings. Standing committees issue a binding opinion 
upon the government appointment to independent agencies, like the independent 
authority on communication (law n. 249/1997). 
91 This is also because of the new provisions of law n. 234/2012, passed to 
enforce the new parliamentary powers provided by the Treaty of Lisbon.  
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of standing committees have been extensively enlarged, particularly in 
terms of the time used for the scrutiny of European draft legislative acts, 
if such activity can be conceived also as a way to oversee the executive.92 
This development has happened, once again, without any formal 
amendment of the rules of procedure, after the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Moreover, given the broad rise in the adoption of legislative 
decrees by the executive (Art. 76 Const.),93 standing committees are 
almost always asked to issue opinions on draft legislative decrees prior 
to their final approval by the government, but it is extremely rare that 
a parliamentary opinion on this draft is given binding effects.94 
A major field where potentially the oversight powers of Italian 
standing committees may be strengthened is that of budgetary and fiscal 
matters. For the first time, constitutional law n. 1/2012 has 
acknowledged at constitutional level the oversight function on public 
finance of the two Chambers, to be regulated by the rules of procedure, 
which, however, have not yet been updated.95 Standing committees, 
particularly those on budget and finance, can become the pivot for the 
fulfillment of this function. 
As for oversight powers, standing committees of the French 
National Assembly were in a completely different position. Due to 
ordonnance n. 58-1100 of 1958 and to the jurisprudence of the Conseil 
constitutionnel, the oversight function of the two Chambers has been put 
under severe constraints. In particular, standing committees were 
precluded from exercising any inquiry, and some subject-matters, like 
foreign policy, defense, internal security, were excluded from being 
subject to committees hearings.96 The oversight function could be 
                                                                                            
92 See European Commission, Annual Report 2012 on relations between the 
European Commission and national parliaments, COM (2013) 565 final: Bruxelles, p. 
4, 30th July 2013, highlights, however, that the number of written opinions sent by the 
Italian Chamber of Deputies to the European Commission, in the light of the early 
warning mechanism and of the “political dialogue” in 2012 has decreased from 28 to 
15 submissions. 
93 Legislative decrees are adopted following a legislative act of delegation by 
the parliament. 
94 See Lupo, Nicola, “Alcune tendenze relative ai pareri parlamentari sui decreti 
legislativi e sui regolamenti del Governo”. In Caretti, Paolo, Osservatorio sulle fonti 
1998. Torino: Giappichelli, p139, 1999, and Albanesi, Enrico, Pareri parlamentari e 
limiti della legge. Milano: Giuffrè, p227-231, 2010. 
95 Constitutional law n. 1/2012 has introduced the balanced budget clause in 
Art. 81 Const. See also the organic law n. 243/2012. Until this constitutional law the 
oversight function of the Chambers was not recognised at constitutional level. 
96 See Avril, Pierre & Gicquel, Jean, Droit parlementaire, cit., p303-304. 
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exercised, within limits, only by the House. Therefore, whereas in Italy 
the enforcement of the oversight tools has been traditionally weak, 
although the tools were in principle provided, in France there were even 
legal limits to the exercise of the oversight function on the part of the 
standing committees of the National Assembly.97 
Fact-finding investigations, known in France as missions 
d’information, now are considered the main tool for providing 
information to the House on matters of public interest (usually on the 
enforcement of legislation), but they are not carried out by the 
committees as such. Rather missions d’information implies the setting up 
of a temporary body, within or outside the competent standing 
committee, often composed of some of its members. 
However, the constitutional reform of 2008 has changed such an 
understanding of the parliamentary oversight powers, although the 
actual effects on the exercise of the standing committees’ oversight 
functions are still unclear. The parliament is now expressly entitled to 
control and assess public policies (Art. 24 Const.). It has been pointed 
out that standing committees are the principal beneficiaries of this 
provision.98 Furthermore an ad hoc standing committee, having a cross-
sectional jurisdiction on all public policies, has been established in the 
National Assembly, the Comité d'évaluation et de contrôle des politiques 
publiques. All the bodies of the National Assembly are represented in this 
committee, which can function as a trait d’union for parliamentary 
procedures dealing with the oversight function and is presided over by 
the Speaker.  
Another (new) power conferred upon standing committees of the 
French National Assembly deals with the confirmation of presidential 
appointments. According to new Art. 13, section 5 Const., some 
presidential appointments to be defined by an organic law, “on account 
of their importance in the guaranteeing of the rights and freedoms or 
the economic and social life of the Nation”, must be confirmed by the 
relevant standing committee, the Committee on Laws. In particular, 
such appointments are deemed rejected if three-fifths of the votes in 
committee does not concur with the presidential decision. However, in 
the light of legislative developments that occurred in 2009 (see organic 
law n. 2009-257 and law n. 2009-258), of the decisions of the Conseil 
                                                                                            
97 See Thiers, Éric, “Le contrôle parlementaire et ses limites juridiques: un 
pouvoir presque sans entraves”. In, Pouvoirs, n°134, p71-81, 2010. 
98 See Dosière, René, “Le contrôle ordinarie”, and Houillon, Philippe, “Le 
contrôle extraordinaire”. Both in, Pouvoirs, n°134, p37 et seqq. and p59 et seqq., 2010. 
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constitutionnel, and following the adoption of the organic law for 
implementing Art. 13 Const., in 2010,99 it does not seem likely that 
standing committees will often veto presidential appointments: the 
quorum to be reached for rejection is rather challenging.100 However, 
standing committees are now in a position to control and review these 
appointments, and this can be considered an enhancement of their 
oversight powers.  
Compared to the case of the Italian and French standing 
committees, the select committees of the British House of Commons are 
more equipped to oversee the conduct of the executive, since they have 
been established exactly for this purpose. 
Select committees enjoy the power to conduct inquiries and thus 
to compel sub poena the appearance of witnesses, as well as to force the 
transmission of information and documents unless executive privileges 
can be invoked. Executive departments have not always shown a 
cooperative attitude towards select committees, by refusing to provide 
information or to send public officials as witnesses. Although drafted in 
the House of Lords, the Scott Report of 1996 has shed light on the 
executive omissions in providing information to parliament, even on 
matters of public interest, as on the illegal trade of weapons to Iraq.101 
Since then the cooperation between the executive and select committees 
has improved, thanks to the Freedom of Information Act 2000, on 
disclosure of the executive’s documents, and to the Minister Code 2005. 
Lastly, since 2009 the guidelines for witnesses in committee hearings – 
the so-called Osmotherly Rule – presume the Minister allows public 
officials working in his department to testify before select committee as 
the general rule. Should the Minister persistently refuse authorization 
to one of the public officials to appear before a select committee, the 
select committee can force the House to execute its order against the 
will of the Minister.  
                                                                                            
99 The enforcement of Art. 13 Const. has been fulfilled by organic law n. 2010-
837 and law n. 2010-838 that set a list of 51 presidential appointments to be subject to 
this procedure. 
100 See Pourhiet, Anne-Marie, “Le pouvoir de nomination du Chef de l’État 
contrôlé par le Parlament”. In, Camby, Jean-Pierre, Fraissex, Patrick & Gicque, Jean, 
La révision de 2008, cit., p57 et seqq. 
101 See Leyland, Peter, “The Westminster Parliament and Executive 
Accountability: The oversight function of departmental select committees with 
reference to the Millennium Dome and the David Kelly affair”. In, Rossi, Emanuele, 
Studi pisani sul Parlamento II, Pisa, Plus-Pisa University Press, p419 et seqq, 2008. 
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A recent reinforcement of the select committees’ oversight powers 
has derived from the acknowledgement to control ministerial 
appointments. Such a result has been reached following a long and 
gradual process, in spite of the reticence of the executive. The green 
paper on The governance of Britain, and later on the coalition agreement 
of 2010, have promoted this achievement. Select committees hear the 
candidates to around thirty positions prior to their appointment, 
although it remains unclear the extent to which a select committee may 
object to an appointment.102 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This papers has first described the origins of standing committees 
in the French, Italian and UK Parliaments and then has analysed the 
structure and the organisation of the three committees system of 
standing committees in each country. Secondly, it has focused on the 
evolution of the French, Italian and UK forms of government in the 
light of the changes of the legislative and oversight powers of the 
standing committees. Finally, in this section some conclusions are 
drawn on the basis of the comparison between the three constitutional 
case studies. 
Prominent scholars have underlined, favourably103 or critically,104 
depending on the case, that parliamentary standing committees are 
crucial for studying the relationship between legislatures and executives 
and how the form of government is shaped. This statement is of the 
utmost importance when we consider that these scholars have directly 
experienced how parliamentary committees work.  
Notwithstanding the complex transformations of constitutional 
legal orders between the twentieth and the twenty-first century 
standing committees seem to confirm their centrality. Indeed, especially 
                                                                                            
102 See McKay, William & Johnson, Charles W., Parliament and Congress, cit., 
p76-77. 
103 See Barthélemy, Joseph, Essai sur le travail parlementaire et le système des 
commissions. Paris: Delagrave, 1934 and Elia, Leopoldo, “Commissioni parlamentari”. 
In, Enciclopedia del diritto, volume VII. Milano: Giuffrè, p895-910, 1960. Both of them 
served as MPs and as Ministers. 
104 Wilson, Woodrow, Congressional Government. A study in American 
politics. New Brunswick:  Trnsaction Publishers, 2009 [1884] and then Wilson, 
Woodrow, Constitutional Government in the United States. Memphis, Tennessee, 
2010 [1908].  
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in parliamentary forms of government, the organizational features, the 
functions and the powers of parliamentary standing committees 
strongly influence the executive’s stability. 
In the three case studies considered, standing committees have 
adapted to the transformation of the form of government so as to 
preserve or even enhance their role, albeit in a different way compared 
to the past. At the same time, the organisation and the functioning of 
standing committees, since their establishment, has shaped 
parliamentary procedures. 
Such a result seems confirmed by looking at the French National 
Assembly, the British House of Commons,105 and the Italian Chamber 
of Deputies, although the structure of their committee systems and the 
powers of standing committees vary significantly. 
The quality and the quantity of committees’ activity can be put in 
direct connection with the level of autonomy of parliamentary decision 
making towards the executive106. This means that the strength of 
legislatures largely relies on the force of its committees107. Any coherent 
attempt to undermine a legislature passes through the restriction of the 
margins of manoeuvre of their committees. However, such an attempt 
would not have the sole effect of challenging the institutional balance 
within the legal system. It could also de-legitimize the policymaking 
process, which is largely based on committees for performing both the 
legislative and the oversight functions. 
 
 
[18.4.2017] 
 
 
Abstract: Parliaments have changed substantially over time, 
particularly in the new century, as a consequence of new phenomena 
appearing in the institutional landscape, such as the transfer of 
                                                                                            
105 Even in a parliament that has been traditionally described as based on a weak 
committee system. On the strengthening of select committees in the British House of 
Commons, see the key-note speech by John Bercow, Speaker of the House of Commons 
on “Towards a 21st century Parliament” at the Handard Society, London, 27th 
November 2013.  
106 See Mattson, Ingvar & Strøm, Kaare, “Parliamentary Committees”. In, 
Döring, Herbert, Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt: 
Campus, p249-307, 1995. 
107 See Lupo, Nicola, “Il ruolo del Governo nelle commissioni parlamentari”. In, 
Studi pisani sul Parlamento III. Pisa: Plus, Pisa University Press, p137-147, 2009. 
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significant normative powers from legislatures to executives, the crisis 
of the long standing representative function of political parties,, 
globalization and regional integration processes of regional integration, 
mediatisation, personalization of politics and populism. By the same 
token, for example we have witnessed a shift in the balance between the 
exercise of the legislative and the oversight function in legislatures in 
favour of the latter. This paper argues that, in spite of the 
transformations of parliaments, standing committees and parliamentary 
committee systems, also by way of constitutional, legislative or standing 
orders’ reforms, have accommodated their role accordingly, and are still 
influential in shaping the form of government. 
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